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Does unconscious thought outperform conscious thought on
complex decisions? A further examination
Todd J. Thorsteinson∗
University of Idaho

Scott Withrow
Bowling Green State University

Abstract
Two experiments examined the benefits of unconscious thought on complex decisions (Dijksterhuis, 2004). Experiment 1 attempted to replicate and extend past research by examining the effect of providing reasons prior to rating the
options. Results indicated no significant differences between the conditions. Experiment 2 attempted to replicate the
findings of Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, and van Baaren (2006) and determine if a memory aid could overcome the
limitations of conscious thought on complex tasks. Results revealed that a memory aid improved decisions compared to
the conscious thought condition. Participants in the unconscious thought condition did not perform significantly better
than did participants in the conscious thought condition.
Keywords: conscious thought, decision making, unconscious thought.

1

Introduction

1.1 Thinking too much

Conventional wisdom indicates that we should think
“hard” about our options when faced with a difficult
decision. By devoting attention and conscious thought
to a difficult decision, one can carefully consider and
weigh the various options and choose the option that
best matches one’s goals. Wilson and Schooler (1991)
challenged this assumption when they found that participants asked to think about their reasons for a decision
made apparently worse decisions than participants who
did not reflect on their reasons for a decision. Recent
work (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren,
& van Baaren, 2006) has cast further doubt on the benefits of consciously thinking about one’s decisions by
demonstrating that consciously thinking about complex
tasks (i.e., tasks which consist of numerous attributes that
participants must weigh in order to determine the best option) can lead to poorer performance than unconscious
thought. Some recent attempts to replicate this effect
have been unsuccessful (Acker, 2008; Newell, Wong,
Cheung, & Rakow, 2009; Rey, Goldstein, & Perruchet,
2009). This paper attempts to replicate the beneficial effects of unconscious thought on complex tasks found by
Dijksterhuis and colleagues and to examine some conditions that may limit the effect.
∗ We would like to thank Tanya Carr, Claudia Mahler, and Rylan
Clark for assistance with Study 1. Address all correspondence to Todd
Thorsteinson, Department of Psychology and Communication Studies,
P.O. Box 443043, University of Idaho, Moscow, ID 83844-3043. Email:
tthorste@uidaho.edu.

A growing body of literature has found evidence that
thinking too much can have detrimental effects on decision making and satisfaction with decisions (e.g., Halberstadt & Levine, 1999; Wilson & LaFleur, 1995; Wilson
& Schooler, 1991). Wilson and Schooler (1991) examined how thinking about the reasons for one’s decision
may affect judgments. They proposed that thinking about
how one feels about an object leads one to focus on plausible and salient factors, which may not be the real factors behind one’s feelings. For example, an individual
may justify his or her selection of a car based on the car’s
high gas mileage, but the person’s preference for the car
may be due to the image the car conveys (e.g., the car is
“sporty”). It may be easier to justify, to oneself and others, the purchase of a car based on gas mileage than on the
image the car conveys. In addition, thinking about multiple attributes, as opposed to just a few attributes, may
highlight the fact that each alternative has some positive
and negative attributes and lead to more moderate evaluations than if one had concentrated on a smaller subset of
attributes (Linville, 1982).
Wilson and Schooler (1991) provided evidence for the
detrimental effects of thinking about reasons on judgments. In Study 1, participants asked to think about
their reasons for liking or disliking different types of jam
showed less correspondence of their judgments with experts than did control participants. In Study 2, control
participants were more likely to recall important information about courses and were more likely to preregister
for highly rated courses than participants asked to think
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about their feelings toward the courses. Thinking about
reasons for judgments or decisions may lead to judgments
that depart from expert or consensual judgments.
The apparent detrimental effects of thinking about reasons are not limited to subjective judgments about the
taste of jam or characteristics that are important in college
courses. Halberstadt and Levine (1999) examined the effect of thinking about reasons on predicting the outcomes
of basketball games. Participants who were asked to think
about reasons for their judgments performed worse at
predicting winners of college basketball games than those
who were asked to make judgments based on intuition or
their “gut.”
These studies (e.g., Halberstadt & Levine, 1999; Wilson & Schooler, 1991) documented possible harmful effects of thinking about reasons for making judgments.
However, thinking carefully about a judgment or decision
does not require individuals to focus on reasons. Tordesillas and Chaiken (1999) point out that there are different
types of introspection and it is important to understand
what types of introspection have negative effects on judgments. For example, Wilson and Schooler (1991, Study
2) had two introspection conditions. In one condition,
the reasons condition, participants were asked to think
about the reasons for liking or disliking the various college courses. In the other condition, the “rate-all” condition, participants were asked to think about each piece of
information and rate how influential it was on their decision. Although both the reasons condition and the rate-all
condition had detrimental effects on judgment, the rateall condition had a greater negative impact than the reasons condition.

1.2

Conscious and unconscious thought

Although previous research has suggested that certain
types of introspection can have detrimental effects (e.g.,
thinking about reasons), Dijksterhuis (2004; Dijksterhuis
et al., 2006) has found that conscious thought performs
worse than unconscious thought for complex decisions.
Conscious thought refers to “cognitive and/or affective
task-relevant processes one is consciously aware of while
attending to a task,” whereas unconscious thought refers
to “cognitive and/or affective task-relevant processes that
take place outside conscious awareness” (Dijksterhuis,
2004, p. 586). The research by Dijksterhuis (2004; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006) suggests that thinking about one’s
options, even when not explicitly instructed to consider
reasons for one’s decision, can harm the quality of decisions on complex tasks.
In the initial demonstration of the detrimental effects of
conscious thought, Dijksterhuis (2004) conducted a series of studies examining whether unconscious thought
outperforms conscious thought on complex tasks. In the
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first three studies, which used similar methodology, participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions, an immediate condition, a conscious thought condition, or an unconscious thought condition. Participants in the immediate condition made their judgments
immediately after viewing all the attributes of the target objects (i.e., apartments or roommates). Conscious
thought participants were asked to carefully think about
the target objects for a brief period (3 minutes in Experiments 1 & 2 and 4 minutes in Experiment 3). Unconscious thought participants were given a distracting
task to complete right after presentation of the attributes,
for the same brief period as participants engaged in conscious thought (3 or 4 minutes). Although the task differed across the three experiments, each task was complex, involving the processing of a large amount of information (e.g., 48 pieces of information in Experiment
1). In each task, one of the target objects was created
to reflect the best option (i.e., most of its attributes were
positive) and one object reflected the worst option (i.e.,
most of its attributes were negative). One or two filler objects was included in each experiment, which had an approximately equal mix of positive and negative attributes.
Participants in the unconscious thought condition showed
greater differentiation between attractive and unattractive
target objects (i.e., greater difference in attractiveness ratings between the attractive object and the unattractive object). In Experiments 4 and 5, Dijksterhuis (2004) examined possible explanations for the results and discovered
that unconscious-thought participants’ recognition of attributes appeared to be more polarized (i.e., greater recognition of positive attributes of best roommate and negative attributes of worst roommate) and showed greater
clustering in memory (i.e., similar traits were more likely
to be recalled in order).
Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006) proposed a theory
of unconscious thought that specified why conscious
thought may impair decision making when faced with
a complex decision. According to their unconsciousthought theory, conscious thought performs worse on
complex decisions because it has limited capacity, suboptimal weighting of attributes, and engages in topdown processing that relies on schemata and expectancies. Conscious thought has limited capacity in that
we can only hold a small amount of information in our
consciousness, whereas the unconscious is considerably
larger. Conscious thought interferes with the correct
weighting of attributes because it focuses on the most
plausible and salient attributes, which are not always the
attributes that determine people’s judgments. Finally,
conscious thought relies more on schemata and expectancies because of the reduced demands on consciousness.
Conscious thought does perform well on simple tasks because it follows rules and is precise.
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In order to directly test whether conscious thought performs better on simple tasks and unconscious thought
performs better on complex tasks, Dijksterhuis et al.
(2006) conducted a series of studies on what they called
the “deliberation-without-attention” effect. In Study 1,
conscious thought participants performed poorly on a
complex task but well on a simple task. Unconscious
thought participants performed equally well on simple
and complex tasks. In Study 2, they replicated the effects
of Study 1 but this time with ratings of four cars (target
objects) instead of a choice among them. In Study 3, they
found a positive relationship between satisfaction with
purchases and amount of conscious processing for simple
products and a negative relationship between satisfaction
with purchases and amount of conscious processing for
complex products. Finally, Study 4 was conducted in a
naturalistic environment, where shoppers at a store with
complex products were compared to shoppers at a store
with less complex products. For those shoppers at the
less complex product store, conscious thought and satisfaction with purchases was positively related, whereas
these measures were negatively related for those shoppers
at the complex products store. These studies provided
strong evidence for the benefits of unconscious thought
for complex decisions.
Other researchers, however, have had difficulty replicating the benefits of unconscious thought over conscious
thought for complex decisions. Some have argued that
further conscious processing may interfere with decision
making, so that it is not unconscious thought that is beneficial, but that extended conscious processing is detrimental (Payne, Samper, Bettman, & Luce, 2008; Rey et al,
2009). Payne et al. (2008) proposed that requiring conscious processing for a fixed time might be detrimental
because it provides too much time to think, causing decision makers to focus on attributes that are less important
to the decision. They included a conscious thought condition that was self-paced; that is, participants were able
to think consciously about the various options as long as
they wished. They created two gambling tasks where
participants selected a lottery from four choices. One
choice maximized the chances of winning and another
choice maximized the expected value of the gamble. In
the first gambling task, the option with the highest probability of winning and the option with the highest expected
value had very similar expected values. Results indicated
that the self-paced conscious thought condition and the
unconscious thought condition performed equally well
in terms of choosing options with high expected value,
and both conditions outperformed the conscious thought
condition. In the second gambling task, they included
a tradeoff between the probability of winning and maximizing the expected value of the gamble, so that the option with the highest probability of winning did not have
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the highest expected value. Results indicated that the selfpaced conscious thought condition outperformed both the
conscious thought condition and the unconscious thought
condition in terms of choosing options with the highest
expected value. The findings were consistent with their
hypotheses that unconscious thought is not good at taking into account magnitude and that conscious thought is
detrimental when a fixed time is required.
Newell et al. (2009) also questioned whether unconscious thought would outperform conscious thought
when making decisions about options with attributes of
varying degrees of importance. They contrasted two
rules, a weighted-additive model (WADD), where the valence of an attribute was weighted by its importance, with
a simpler model where the option with the largest number
of positive attributes is preferred (TALLY). Dijksterhuis
and Nordgren (2006) proposed that unconscious thought
is better than conscious thought at providing appropriate weights to attributes, but this was not tested in Dijksterhuis’s (2004; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006) studies as
they used the TALLY model to define the best option.
Newell et al., in their first experiment, created a decision task involving four apartments similar to Dijksterhuis’s (2004). They constructed the options so that the
apartment with the largest number of positive attributes
was not the “best” apartment based on the weighting of
the attributes (WADD model; this apartment had fewer
positive attributes, but the positive attributes were more
important). The best apartment according to the WADD
model was the most frequently chosen apartment for each
condition. Participants in the unconscious thought condition performed similarly to participants in the conscious
thought condition. The similarity in performance suggests that participants in the unconscious thought condition were sensitive to differences in magnitude of the
apartments’ attributes.
The purpose of our research was to replicate the findings of Dijksterhuis and colleagues regarding the benefits
of unconscious thought over conscious thought on complex tasks and to explore the nature of the effect. Acker
(2008) conducted a meta-analysis of studies comparing
conscious and unconscious thought and found a great
deal of variability in effect sizes across studies. We included a condition requiring participants to provide their
reasons for their choice. This condition is similar to the
conscious thought condition, but required participants to
write down their reasons for or against each target object.
Research has documented the detrimental effects of asking participants to provide reasons for their choices (Halberstadt & Levine, 1999; Wilson & Schooler, 1991) and
we were interested in comparing the reasons condition
to a conscious thought condition. A reasons condition
would ensure that participants were engaging in considerable thought about the options, and might further im-

Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 4, No. 3, April 2009

pair decision making relative to an unconscious thought
condition. Providing reasons may lead participants to focus on more information, including information that is
not important for distinguishing among options.
We also included a recall measure to help understand
the findings. Tordesillas and Chaiken (1999) found that
participants asked to introspect about their decisions had
poorer recall of important information. We asked whether
a similar effect might occur with conscious processing.
Participants instructed to think carefully about a decision
(conscious thought condition and reasons condition) may
spend too much time on information that is unimportant
to the decision.

2
2.1
2.1.1

Experiment 1
Method
Participants and design

Students (N = 153) were recruited from the psychology
subject pool at the University of Idaho and participated
in exchange for course credit. The sample was relatively
evenly divided between men (n = 71) and women (n =
82). We asked participants to make attractiveness judgments about four apartments and to recall as many attributes as possible. We counterbalanced the order so
that half the participants recalled the apartment attributes
prior to judging the attractiveness of the attributes and
half judged the attractiveness of the apartments and then
recalled the apartment attributes.
Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in
a 2 (order: judgment before recall or recall before judgment) x 4 (mode of thought: immediate judgment, conscious thought, reasons, and unconscious thought) x 4
(apartments) mixed design, with the last factor as withinsubjects.
Manipulating the order of recall and attractiveness
judgments poses a problem for the unconscious thought
condition.
Having participants in the unconscious
thought condition recall information before making judgments is likely to disrupt unconscious thought and make
the condition more similar to conscious thought. Our design allows us to test for this possibility and so we examined possible interactions with order on all our dependent
measures.
2.1.2

Procedure and stimulus materials

Students participated in groups of up to five individuals.
Stimulus materials were presented via computer using
MediaLab software (Jarvis, 2006). Participants evaluated
four apartments based on the information presented. Participants were not informed about the amount of informa-
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tion, but were told that each piece of information would
be presented for four seconds. After participants read the
instructions, 15 pieces of information about each apartment were presented one at a time for four seconds each.
Apartments and apartment attributes were presented in
an order randomized for each participant; however, all
attributes of one apartment were presented before information about the next apartment was presented. Three
attributes for each apartment were included that were
not helpful in discriminating between the apartments, as
the three attributes were either neutral in valence (e.g.,
type of trees near the apartment) or constant across all
apartments (e.g., “washers and dryers are available in the
building” was included in the description of all four apartments). The most attractive apartment was characterized
by nine positive attributes, three negative attributes, and
three neutral attributes. The least attractive apartment was
characterized by nine negative attributes, three positive
attributes, and three neutral attributes. Two filler apartments were included, both of which consisted of six positive attributes, six negative attributes, and three neutral
attributes. (See the Appendix for listing of apartment attributes).
After the presentation of apartment attributes, the participants in the immediate judgment condition rated the
attractiveness of the four apartments. Order of the attractiveness judgments was fixed (i.e., all participants rated
Apartment A first, then Apartment B, etc.). Participants
in the conscious thought condition deliberated for four
minutes about which apartment they liked the best. In the
reasons condition, participants spent four minutes listing
their reasons for liking and disliking the four apartments.
They were told the purpose was to organize their thoughts
about which apartment they liked the best and that their
responses would not be collected. Finally, participants in
the unconscious thought condition worked on an n-back
test (n-back of 2; Jonides et al., 1997) for four minutes as
a distractor task.
Participants recalled as many attributes as possible
about each apartment. Order of responses to the recall
task was randomized for each participant (i.e., some participants recalled attributes of Apartment C first, some
recalled attributes of Apartment D first, etc.). Prior to the
recall task, participants were not aware that they would
be asked to recall the apartment attributes. Half of the
participants completed the recall task prior to rating the
attractiveness of the apartments and the remaining half
completed the recall task after rating the attractiveness
of the apartments. At the end of the study, participants
completed items about their satisfaction with the way in
which they made the decision, their perceptions of the
difficulty of the task, and some demographic items.
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2.1.3

Measures

1. Attractiveness of apartments. Participants were asked
to rate the attractiveness of each apartment on a 9-point
scale ranging from 1 (not at all attractive) to 9 (extremely
attractive). We considered the highest rated apartment to
be the most attractive one to the participant.
2. Decision satisfaction. Six items were included to
assess participants’ satisfaction with their decision making process (e.g., “I am satisfied with the way I reached
the judgments regarding the attractiveness of the apartments,” “The process I used to judge the attractiveness
of the apartments was effective”). These items were on
a 9-point scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9
(strongly agree). We removed one item as it lowered reliability. Coefficient alpha for the five items was 0.87.
3. Perceived ease of the task. Participants responded
to one item about the ease of the task (“The apartments
were easy to evaluate”), which was assessed on a 7-point
scale (1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree).
4. Recall of attributes. Participants listed as many attributes as they could recall about the four apartments.
For each apartment, we coded the total number of items
correctly recalled, number of positive items recalled,
number of neutral items recalled, number of negative
items recalled, number of errors, number of positive errors (i.e., attribute was negative but recalled as a positive
attribute), and number of negative errors (i.e., attribute
was positive but recalled as a negative attribute). Both authors coded this information and were blind to the participants’ condition. Intraclass correlations, assessing consistency and agreement, ranged from .89 to .99 (LeBreton
& Senter, 2008). Discrepancies between our ratings were
resolved through discussion.

2.2

Results and discussion

Ratings of the attractiveness of the apartments were similar across mode of thought conditions. However, the order of the recall and judgment tasks did appear to affect
participants in the unconscious thought condition. When
judgments preceded recall, the difference in ratings between the best and worst apartment was larger than when
recall preceded judgments for the unconscious thought
condition. Thus, when judgment preceded recall, our
findings were consistent with those reported by Dijksterhuis (2004; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006).
Our analysis of the recall data tested whether participants in the conscious thought condition would show
greater recall of neutral attributes compared to participants in the unconscious thought condition. Our results
indicated no support for this hypothesis, as participants
in the unconscious thought condition recalled a higher
proportion of neutral attributes than did participants in
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the conscious thought condition. Details regarding these
analyses and the analyses involving perceptions of the
task are provided below.
2.2.1 Attractiveness of the apartments
A 2 (order: recall first or judgment first) x 4 (mode of
thought: immediate, conscious, reasons, unconscious) x
4 (apartment) mixed ANOVA was conducted to determine the effects of unconscious thought on ratings of
the attractiveness of the apartments.1 Order and mode
of thought were between-subject factors and apartment
was a within-subject factor. We found no main effect for
mode of thought, F(3,145) = 0.30, p = .82, partial η 2 =
.01, and no main effect for order, F(1,145) = 0.86, p = .36,
partial η 2 = .01. None of the two-way or three-way interactions was significant (p’s > .30, partial η 2 ‘s < .01). The
apartments were perceived as differing in attractiveness,
F(3,435) = 48.50, p < .001, partial η 2 = .25. As expected,
the best apartment was the most attractive (M = 7.04, SD
= 1.77) and the worst apartment was the least attractive
(M = 4.54, SD = 1.67). See Figure 1 for the attractiveness
ratings for each apartment by mode of thought.
The pattern of the means suggested that requiring participants to recall the attributes prior to making their judgments might have been harmful to the judgments made by
participants in the unconscious thought condition. The
three-way interaction was not significant, but this may
have reflected a lack of power, so we examined the twoway interaction between order and apartment for each
condition. None of the two-way interactions between order and apartment approached significance for the immediate, conscious, and reasons conditions (p’s > .70, partial η 2 ‘s < .01). The order and apartment interaction appeared to have some effect in the unconscious thought
condition, F(3,108) = 2.41, p = .07, partial η 2 = .06. As
shown in Figure 2, the difference in attractiveness ratings between the best apartment and worst apartment was
greater when judgment preceded recall than when recall
preceded judgment. Asking participants to recall the attributes before making the judgments may have induced
conscious thought in these participants. Easily recalled
attributes might have exerted a stronger influence on their
judgments of attractiveness.
1 We conducted additional analyses to examine possible sex differences. In Experiment 1 and Experiment 3 of Dijksterhuis (2004),
the difference in performance between the unconscious and conscious
thought conditions was found for men, but not for women. A 2 (sex:
male or female) X 4 (mode of thought: immediate, conscious, reasons,
unconscious) X 4 (apartment) mixed ANOVA was conducted on attractiveness ratings to test for possible sex differences. We did not examine
possible order effects because including that variable in the analyses
would result in small sample sizes in each cell. There was no main
effect of sex on attractiveness ratings, F(1,145) = 1.18, p = .28, partial η 2 = .01, and no interaction between sex and mode of thought on
attractiveness ratings, F(3,145) = 0.38, p = .77, partial η 2 = .01.
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Figure 1: Attractiveness ratings of the four apartments by
mode of thought. Error bars indicate one standard error.

Figure 2: Attractiveness ratings in the unconscious
thought condition. Error bars indicate one standard error.

Given that having the recall task precede the judgment
task may have disrupted unconscious thought, we conducted a comparison between unconscious thought and
conscious thought when judgment preceded recall. A
2 (mode of thought: unconscious thought vs. conscious
thought) x 2 (apartment: best vs. worst) mixed ANOVA
was conducted on attractiveness ratings. The interaction
between mode of thought and apartment was not statistically significant, F(1,36) = 1.10, p = .30, partial η 2 =
.03, nor was the main effect for mode of thought, F(1,36)
= 1.60, p = .21, partial η 2 = .04, but the direction of
the means was consistent with Dijksterhuis’s findings.
The difference between the best and worst apartment was
greater for the unconscious thought condition (M = 3.56,
SD = 2.12) compared to the conscious thought condition
(M = 2.70, SD = 2.81; d = 0.34).

be some difference in proportion of neutral attributes recalled as a function of mode of thought, F(3,99) = 1.99,
p = .12, partial η 2 = .06, but the pattern of means did not
match our predictions. The unconscious thought (M =
0.22, SD = 0.19) and immediate conditions (M = 0.22, SD
= 0.16) recalled a higher proportion of neutral attributes
than the conscious thought (M = 0.16, SD = 0.13) and
reasons conditions (M = 0.16, SD = 0.12), suggesting that
neutral attributes did not receive undue focus from conscious thought participants.
The pattern of means suggested an interaction between
mode of thought and apartment on proportion of neutral
attributes recalled, F(9,297) = 1.63, p = .11, partial η 2
= .05. As shown in Figure 3, the conscious thought and
reasons condition had similar patterns of recall of neutral attributes. Unconscious thought participants recalled
a higher portion of neutral attributes for the worst apartment, which may have interfered with their ability to attend to the more relevant attributes of the worst apartment.
The interaction between order and mode of thought appeared to affect the proportion of neutral attributes recalled, F(3,99) = 2.30, p = .08, partial η 2 = .07. As
shown in Figure 4, all the mode of thought conditions, except the unconscious thought condition, showed a higher
proportion of recall of neutral attributes when judgment
preceded recall. This pattern was reversed in the unconscious thought condition. Recalling attributes prior to
judging the options may have been especially disruptive
to unconscious thought participants. Instead of relying

2.2.2

Recall of attributes

Conscious thought might perform more poorly relative
to unconscious thought if it focuses on less important attributes. As there were differences in the number of attributes recalled, we divided the number of neutral items
recalled by the total number of items recalled for each
apartment to get the proportion of neutral information recalled. To examine whether conscious thought participants had better recall for neutral attributes compared to
unconscious thought participants, a 2 (order) x 4 (mode of
thought: immediate, conscious, reasons, unconscious) x
4 (apartment) mixed ANOVA was conducted on the proportion of neutral attributes recalled. There appeared to
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Figure 3: Mean proportion of neutral attributes recalled
by mode of thought and apartment. Error bars indicate
one standard error.

Figure 4: Mean proportion of neutral attributes recalled
by order and mode of thought. Error bars indicate one
standard error.

on their holistic judgment obtained through unconscious
processing, participants may have relied on their memories of attributes when completing the rating task. Dijksterhuis (2004; Experiment 2) found that participants
in the unconscious thought condition were more likely to
report making a global impression or judgment (55.6%)
than did participants in the conscious thought condition
(26.5%). Having the recall task precede the judgment
task may have altered the decision strategy for participants in the unconscious thought condition.
The analysis of the recall of neutral attributes revealed
that participants in the conscious thought condition were
not overly focused on neutral attributes compared to participants in the unconscious thought condition. Contrary
to expectations, participants in the unconscious thought
condition were not better at ignoring the neutral attributes
compared to conscious thought participants.2

2.2.3 Decision satisfaction and perceived ease of task

2 We also examined differences in recall of positive and negative attributes across modes of thought. Dijksterhuis (2004) reported evidence
that unconscious thought participants recognized positive attributes of
the best option and negative attributes of the worst option more frequently than negative attributes of the best option and positive attributes
of the worst option. We examined whether a similar effect would occur
with recall. We divided the number of positive attributes recalled for
each apartment and divided it by the total number of positive attributes
for each apartment, giving us a proportion of positive attributes recalled.
Likewise, we divided the number of negative attributes recalled for each
apartment and divided it by the total number of negative attributes for
each apartment, giving us a proportion of negative attributes recalled.
A 2 (order) x 4 (mode of thought) x 2 (apartment) x 2 (valence) mixed
ANOVA was conducted, with the last two factors (i.e., apartment and
valence) as within-subject factors. Evidence consistent with Dijkster-

We expected that unconscious thought participants would
be less satisfied with the decision process because they
were unable to devote significant time to consider the
apartments. This prediction was not supported, as there
were no differences between the mode of thought conditions in satisfaction, F(3,145) = 0.60, p = .62, partial η 2
= .01. The main effect for order (i.e., whether recall occurred prior to or after judgments of the apartments) was
not significant, F(1,145) = 0.01, p = .94, partial η 2 = .00,
but the interaction between mode of thought and order
accounted for a small effect, F(3, 145) = 1.80, p = .15,
partial η 2 = .04. Follow-up analyses of the interaction revealed that the effect of order on satisfaction with the decision process was most pronounced in the unconscious
thought condition. Unlike the other mode of thought conditions, participants in the unconscious thought condition were more satisfied with the decision process when
judgment preceded recall than when recall preceded judgment, F(1,36) = 3.76, p = .06, partial η 2 = .10 (see Figure
5).
We also examined whether participants would differ in
their perceptions of the ease of the task. No significant
differences for the mode of thought conditions on percephuis (2004) would be reflected in a three-way interaction between mode
of thought, apartment, and valence. The three way interaction was not
significant, F(3,124) = 0.05, p = .99, partial η 2 = .00, and an inspection
of the means indicated that the pattern was not consistent with Dijksterhuis (2004).
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sions, even though it is the impressions of the apartments
that are driving the decision.
Unconscious
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Immediate

Satisfaction with Decision Process
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Recall then Judge

Judge then Recall

Order

Figure 5: Satisfaction with the decision process by mode
of thought. Error bars indicate one standard error.
tions of ease was found, F(3,145) = 0.36, p = .78, partial
η 2 = .01. There was no effect due to order of recall and
judgment, F(1,145) = 0.02, p = .89, partial η 2 = .00, and
no interaction effect between order and mode of thought,
F(3,145) = 0.90, p = .44, partial η 2 = .02. Participants
found the task to be neither overly difficult nor overly
easy, as the mean response was near the midpoint of the
scale (M = 4.38, SD = 1.54).
2.2.4

Conclusions

Although participants in the unconscious thought conditions did not perform better on the task than conscious
thought participants, the pattern of means, when the recall task occurred after the ratings, was consistent with
the findings of Dijksterhuis (2004). We found no difference between the reasons condition and the other conditions, suggesting that asking participants to provide reasons for their decision does not interfere with decision
making more than asking participants to think about their
options. Thinking about reasons may be detrimental because it may focus decision makers on factors that are
easy to articulate and justify to others. Our failure to find
detrimental effects of the reasons condition compared to
the other conditions may be because the task involved descriptions of the options without experiencing them. Visiting apartments may provide decision makers with impressions about apartments that are influential in their final choice, but may be difficult to articulate. Thinking
about reasons may force decision makers to consider attributes that they can state clearly, as opposed to impres-

3 Experiment 2
The differences between our stimulus materials and the
stimulus materials used by Dijksterhuis may explain our
inability to replicate his results. We conducted a second
experiment using the stimulus materials from Study 1 of
Dijksterhuis et al. (2006) to address this possibility. We
also sought to investigate whether the poor performance
of conscious thought is due to memory limitations. Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006) proposed that a major
weakness of conscious thought for complex decisions is
its limited capacity. However, decision makers may utilize aids to help overcome this limitation.
Two recent studies investigated whether memory limitations may explain the relatively poor performance of
conscious thought. Rey et al. (2009), utilizing the stimulus materials from Dijksterhuis et al. (2006), included
a conscious thought condition where all 48 attributes
were written on a sheet of paper and provided to participants as they deliberated for four minutes. Performance in this condition was compared to an unconscious
thought condition and an immediate condition. No statistically significant differences were found among the conditions, but participants in the immediate condition made
the largest number of correct choices (80%), followed
by the unconscious thought condition (63.3%), and the
conscious thought condition (50%). Unfortunately, their
study lacked a conscious thought condition where participants relied on their memory for the attributes, making
it difficult to determine the benefits of providing all the
attribute information.
Newell et al. (2009) addressed this issue in their second experiment. They included an immediate condition,
an unconscious thought condition, a conscious thought
condition (where participants had to rely on their memory), and a conscious thought with information condition
(where participants were provided with an information
board displaying all the attributes for the options while
they deliberated). Memory difficulties did not appear to
be a problem as the conscious thought condition and the
conscious thought with information conditions chose the
best apartment at similar rates (82.6% and 78.3%, respectively). The conscious thought conditions chose the best
apartment more frequently than did participants in the unconscious thought condition (65.2%), but the difference
was not statistically significant.
We expanded on this research by investigating the effects of a memory aid on conscious processing. Presenting all the attributes of the options overcomes memory
limitations, but it may disrupt conscious processing if it
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leads participants to focus on attributes that are relatively
unimportant to them. Payne et al. (2008) suggested that
thinking too much about a decision leads to a dilution
effect, as less important information receives too much
attention. In Experiment 2, we examined whether the
poor performance of conscious thought could be overcome with a memory aid (i.e., asking participants to take
notes during the presentation of the attributes). Not only
does this overcome memory limitations, but it also allows
participants to record attributes that they believe are the
most relevant to their decision and leave off less important attributes.

had four minutes to think carefully about the cars before
they made a choice. Participants in the immediate decision condition made their choice immediately following
the presentation of the car attributes.
After participants chose the car they liked the best, they
rated the importance of each of the 12 attributes (e.g.,
handling, gas mileage) on a scale of 1 (not at all important) to 7 (very important). After rating each attribute,
participants answered some demographic questions and
were debriefed.

3.1

Our results failed to replicate Dijksterhuis et al.
(2006). The unconscious thought condition and conscious thought conditions chose the best car (Hatsdun)
at similar levels. Participants in the conscious thought
with notes condition chose the best car more frequently
than the other conditions, but this difference was significant only for the comparison with the conscious thought
condition.
We analyzed participants’ ratings of subjective importance of the car attributes to determine if unconscious
thought participants made choices more consistent with
their importance ratings than other conditions. The unconscious thought condition did not perform significantly
better than the other conditions.

3.1.1

Method
Participants and design

We recruited participants (N = 162) from a psychology
subject pool at the University of Idaho. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of four conditions: an immediate decision condition, a conscious thought condition,
a conscious thought with notes condition, and an unconscious thought condition. Seven participants were eliminated from the data for not following directions (e.g., failing to take notes) or responding randomly, resulting in a
final sample of 155.
3.1.2

Procedure and stimulus materials

The stimulus materials were from Dijksterhuis et al.
(2006). Students participated in groups of up to five individuals. Stimulus materials were presented via computer using MediaLab software (Jarvis, 2006). Participants chose the car they liked best from four cars. Fortyeight attributes (twelve attributes for 4 cars) were presented one at a time, in random order, for eight seconds.
Each piece of information described a positive or negative
feature of the car. The “best” car (i.e., the Hatsdun) was
categorized by 75% positive attributes and the “worst”
car (i.e., the Nabusi) was characterized by 25% positive
attributes. Two additional cars, the Kaiwa and Dasuka,
were included with 58% and 50% positive attributes, respectively (there was an error in the stimulus materials
listed in Dijksterhuis et al., 2006, so that the Kaiwa had
58% positive attributes as opposed to 50%).
Participants in the conscious thought condition had
four minutes after the presentation of the information to
think carefully about the cars. In the unconscious thought
condition, participants were distracted from thinking
about the cars for four minutes by working on a series
of anagrams. After four minutes had passed, participants
chose the car they liked the best. Participants in the conscious thought with notes condition were asked to take
notes on the cars and were told that the notes would not be
collected. After the presentation of the information, they

3.2 Results and discussion

3.2.1 Car choice
The conscious thought with notes condition had the highest percentage of correct decisions (i.e., chose the car,
Hatsdun, with the most positive attributes; 70.7%), followed by the unconscious thought condition (56.8%), the
immediate thought condition (52.5%), and the conscious
thought condition (48.6%; see Figure 6).
As demonstrated in Table 1, participants in the unconscious thought condition did not perform significantly
better than the other conditions. We did find that the conscious thought with notes condition made significantly
more correct decisions than did participants in the conscious thought condition.
3.2.2 Importance ratings
Consistent with Dijksterhuis (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006), we defined the most attractive car
as the one with the largest number of positive attributes.
However, depending on which attributes were most important to an individual, a car with fewer positive attributes may have been perceived as more attractive. Using participants’ ratings of attribute importance, we examined how well participants’ judgments matched up
with their subjective ratings of importance (similar to the
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Table 1: Results of comparisons between modes of
thought on choice.

100
Unconscious
Conscious.with.Notes
Conscious
Immediate

80

Choice

60

Comparison
Unconscious vs. immediate
Unconscious vs. conscious
Unconscious vs. conscious with notes
Conscious vs. conscious with notes

χ2 (1)

p

φ

0.14
0.49
1.65
3.96

.708
.485
.199
.047

.04
.08
.15
.23

40

Table 2: Mean difference between maximum score and
score for chosen car by mode of thought.

20

Hatsdun
Mean 57.15

Kaiwa
Mean 28.3

Dasuka
Mean 12.5

Nabusi
Mean 2.025

Car

Figure 6: Car choices by mode of thought.
analysis in Experiment 3 of Dijksterhuis, 2004). For each
of the four cars, we added the importance ratings for the
positive attributes and subtracted the importance ratings
for the negative attributes. This provided a score for each
car for each participant. We calculated the difference between the maximum score and the score for the chosen
car.3 Thus, if participants chose the car with the highest
score, the difference would be zero. The larger the difference score, the poorer the choice. As shown in Table 2,
the conscious with notes condition had the smallest difference score, suggesting that they were choosing the car
that best matched their subjective importance ratings. A
oneway ANOVA was conducted to test whether the difference scores were affected by mode of thought. No
overall difference was found, F(3,151) = 1.65, p = .18, η 2
= .03, but linear contrasts were conducted to explore possible differences among the conditions. The conscious
with notes condition had a smaller mean difference than
the mean difference for the other three conditions combined, t(151) = 1.99, p = .05, d = .36. No significant
difference was found between the conscious and unconscious thought conditions, t(151) = 0.32, p = .75, d = .06.
These results suggest that our inability to find a beneficial effect for unconscious thought is not due to subjective preferences of the car attributes.
3.2.3

Sex differences

We also checked for sex differences on performance, as
Dijksterhuis (2004; Experiments 1 and 3) found that fe3 We

thank Jonathan Baron for suggesting this analysis.

Mode of thought

n

M

SD

Unconscious
Conscious with Notes
Conscious
Immediate

37
41
37
40

10.54
4.44
9.57
7.55

19.15
9.70
11.87
10.27

male participants performed equally well in the conscious
and unconscious conditions, but men performed significantly better in the unconscious condition compared to
the conscious condition. We found that women chose
the best car more frequently (62.4%) than men (48.1%),
χ2 (1) = 2.91, p = .09, φ = .14. However, our results
are not consistent with Dijksterhuis, as male participants
in our study performed equally poorly in the conscious
thought condition and in the unconscious thought condition (see Figure 7). Male and female participants may
have adopted different strategies for choosing among the
cars.

4 General discussion
Two experiments examined the benefits of unconscious
thought on complex decisions. Both experiments failed to
find a significant difference on performance between participants in the conscious thought condition and those in
the unconscious thought condition. Experiment 1 found
that a reasons condition, where participants had to list
their reasons for their ratings, resulted in similar judgments to the conscious thought condition. Experiment 2
revealed that conscious thought combined with a memory
aid resulted in better judgments than conscious thought.
This highlights an important boundary condition for research on unconscious thought. If decision makers take
notes or review information, they can compensate for the
limited capacity of conscious thought.
Although neither of our experiments found statistically
significant differences between performance in the con-
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thought to occur. Acker (2008) pointed out that most of
the published research finds support for the benefits of unconscious thought, whereas unpublished data have shown
less support for the advantages of unconscious thought.
A better understanding of the nature of the effect requires
making available results that are supportive and not supportive of the benefits of unconscious thought.

60

4.1 Why did our results fail to replicate Dijksterhuis and colleagues?

40

20

Unconscious

Conscious with Notes

Conscious

Immediate

Mode of Thought

Figure 7: Percentage of men and women selecting the
best car by mode of thought. Error bars indicate one standard error.

scious and unconscious thought conditions, the patterns
of means were in the predicted direction. Our results,
combined with the recent work by Acker (2008), suggest that the beneficial effects of unconscious thought
may be relatively small. In Experiment 1, when the recall task was completed after the ratings of attractiveness,
participants in the unconscious thought condition showed
greater discrimination between the most and least attractive apartment (mean difference of 3.56) compared to
conscious thought participants (mean difference of 2.70).
Unconscious thought participants in Experiment 2 also
made more correct decisions (56.8%) than did conscious
thought participants (48.6%). The size of these differences is similar to the mean effect size of 0.25 reported
by Acker (2008). Acker (2008) reported a large amount
of variability between effect sizes suggesting a need for
examination of moderator variables. Payne et al. (2008)
identified one possible moderator variable. They provided evidence that conscious thought performs worse
than unconscious thought when a four minute time requirement for conscious processing is imposed, but that
self-paced conscious thought outperforms unconscious
thought.
The present results failed to replicate those of Dijksterhuis and colleagues. The difficulty of replicating the
effect suggests that it may occur only under specific conditions. Studies that do and do not find similar effects
as Dijksterhuis will help advance our understanding of
the conditions required for the benefits of unconscious

To understand the implications of our findings, we discuss some of the possible reasons why our results failed
to replicate the results reported by Dijksterhuis and colleagues. One possibility is that the response mode (i.e.,
judgment vs. choice) may be a factor. Noncompensatory
strategies, which simplify the task, are likely to be more
common when making choices in comparison to judgments (Billings & Scherer, 1988). However, Dijksterhuis and colleagues (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis et
al., 2006) have demonstrated that unconscious thought
outperforms conscious thought on complex tasks using
a choice task and a judgment task. Both of our studies
failed to find the beneficial effects of unconscious thought
even though different response modes were used in the
two studies.
Our Experiment 2 produced similar results to Experiment 2 of Dijksterhuis (2004). Our unconscious
thought participants correctly chose the best car (56.8%),
whereas their unconscious thought participants chose the
best apartment (59.3%). Our conscious thought participants chose the best car (48.6%), whereas their conscious
thought participants chose the best car (47.1%). The only
noticeable difference is that our immediate condition outperformed (52.5%) their immediate condition (36.4%).
Participants in our study may have adopted a noncompensatory strategy, focusing on one or two salient attributes,
which may explain the lack of differences found across
our conditions.
The first experiment may not have been sufficiently
complex to yield the benefit for unconscious thought.
Participants in our Experiment 1 may have perceived the
task as easier than did participants in the Dijksterhuis
(2004) studies. The difference between ratings of the
most attractive and least attractive apartment was considerably larger in our study than in Experiment 1 of Dijksterhuis (2004; note that we used a 9-point scale and
Dijksterhuis used a 10-point scale). However, the difference between our ratings of the most attractive and least
attractive apartment (mean difference of 2.50) was similar
to Experiment 3 of Dijksterhuis (2004; mean difference
of 2.65). Thus, it would appear that our task was sufficiently complex for the beneficial effects of unconscious
thought to appear, assuming such an effect exists.
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4.2

Conclusions

Our results combined with the results of Acker (2008)
suggest that it is too soon to conclude that unconscious
thought outperforms conscious thought on complex decisions. Our results demonstrate that conscious thought for
complex decisions can be improved by incorporating a
memory aid. Because of the limited capacity of conscious
thought, some assistance is needed for complex decisions
to ensure that decision makers can remember all the relevant information. Our results suggest a memory aid may
be a better strategy than relying on unconscious thought.
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Appendix: Apartment attributes in Experiment 1
Apartment A (Best Apartment)

Apartment B (Worst Apartment)

Rent is cheaper than comparable apartments

Rent is more expensive than comparable apartments

Short walk to places you frequent

Long drive to places you frequent

Average size

Above average in size

Heating bill is average

Heating bill is high

No air conditioning

Has air conditioning

Has a dishwasher

No dishwasher

Attractive interior and exterior

Okay looking interior and exterior

New

Old

Quiet

Somewhat noisy

Free high speed internet

High speed internet not included

Reserved parking space next to building

Parking available on street only

Landlord is unfriendly

Landlord is friendly

Apartment complex was named after a local community Apartment complex was named after a former president
leader
Lots of apple trees on the property

Lots of maple trees on the property

Washers and dryers are available in the building

Washers and dryers are available in the building

Apartment C (Average Apartment)

Apartment D (Average Apartment)

Rent is cheaper than comparable apartments

Rent is more expensive than comparable apartments

Long drive to places you frequent

Short walk to places you frequent

Above average in size

Average size

Heating bill is high

Heating bill is average

Has air conditioning

No air conditioning

Has a dishwasher

No dishwasher

Attractive interior and exterior

Okay looking interior and exterior

Old

New

Somewhat noisy

Quiet

High speed internet not included

Free high speed internet included

Parking available on street only

Reserved parking space next to building

Landlord is friendly

Landlord is unfriendly

Apartment complex was named after a local community Apartment complex was named after a former president
leader
Lots of oak trees on the property

Lots of elm trees on the property

Washers and dryers are available in the building

Washers and dryers are available in the building

